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I. JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann., Section 78-2a-3(j), this being a case transferred to the Court of Appealsfromthe
Supreme Court. This case involves an appeal and cross appeal takenfromthefinaljudgment
of the Second Judicial District Court of Weber County. The Utah Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann., Section 78-2-2(j) in that the case involves an appeal taken
from a judgment of the District Court over which the Court of Appeals does not have original
appellate jurisdiction. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 78-2-2(4), the Supreme Court on
March 8,2001, entered an order transferring the matter to the Utah Court of Appeals.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW & STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE I
WAS AIM REQUIRED TO PROVIDE NOTICE AS OUTLINED IN THE
PROMISSORY NOTE AS A PREREQUISITE TO FORECLOSURE
The type of notice that is required under the contract documents as a prerequisite to
foreclosure involves an question of contract interpretation which this court reviews for legal
correctness giving no deference to the trial court. Sanders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796 (Utah Ct.
App.1992). This issue was raised in Edwards' pretrial motion to dismiss, motion for summary
judgment, and again at trial (R. at 406, 459, 500).
ISSUE II
WAS AIM REQUIRED UNDER THE TERMS OF THE TRUST DEED
TO GIVE NOTICE TO BORROWER AS A PRECONDITION
TO RECOVERING ATTORNEY FEES
The type of notice required under the contract documents involves a matter of contract
1

interpretation which this court reviews for legal correctness, giving no deference to the trial court.
Sanders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796 (Utah Ct.App.1992). This issue was raised during Edwards
motion for summary judgment and again at trial (R. at 406,459, 500).
ISSUEffl
WAS THE CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED IN A PRIOR
LAWSUIT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

(

Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action involves a question of law which this
court reviews for legal correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. Anderson v. Doms,

*

984 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah Ct.App.1999); Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 314 (Utah 1998).
Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies is similarly a question of law reviewed for
correctness. Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407 (Utah Ct.App.1990). This issue was preserved in the
trial court record in connection with Edwards' pretrial motion to dismiss, motion for summary
judgment, and again raised during trial (R. at 138,169,406, 500) (T. at 39,333).

i

ISSUE IV
DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF ATTORNEY
FEES FOR THE PARTY'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE ORDERED DISCOVERY

<

Whether the trial court should bar the admission of evidence because a party failed to
comply with discovery obligations involves a matter where the trial court has broad discretion
i
in the selection and imposition of sanctions and this court will review under the abuse of
discretion standard giving deference to the trial court. State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527 (Utah
Ct.App. 1997); Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932,940 (Utah 1998); Tuck v. Godfrey,
367 Utah Adv. Rep. 42,43 (Utah Ct.App.1999); Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d
271,274, (Utah 1997).
A
2

ISSUE V
WAS THE ISSUE OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AMENDMENT TO
RULE 26(e) PROPERLY BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE TRIAL COURT
In order for an appellate court to consider a matter, it must have first been brought to
the attention of the trial court. Whether the issue has been properly preserved for appeal
depends on an examination of the trial record.
ISSUE VI
DOES THE ESTATE OF JAMES WESLEY EDWARDS HAVE
STANDING TO BRING THIS APPEAL
The standing of a party and the right to bring an appeal before this court is a matter of
law that this court reviews for legal correctness, giving the trial court's legal determinations no
deference. Standard Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1991).
in. RELEVANT RULES OF PROCEDURE
Rule 26(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(e) Supplementation of responses. A party who has made a disclosure under
Subdivision (a) or responded to a request for discovery with a response is
under a duty to supplement the disclosure or response to include information
thereafter acquired if ordered by the court or in the following circumstances:
(1) A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals disclosures
under Subdivision (a) if the party learns that in some material respect the
information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or
corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other
parties during the discovery process or in writing. With respect to testimony
of an expert witnessfromwhom a report is required under Subdivision (a)(3)(B)
the duty extends both to information contained in the report and to information
provided through a deposition of the expert.
(2) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to an interrogatory,
request for production, or request for admission if the party learns that the response
is in some material respect incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or
3

(

corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties
during the discovery process or in writing.
Rule 26(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: (Trior to November 1. 1999)
(e)

Supplementation of responses. A party who has responded to a request for
discovery with a response that was complete when made is under no duty to
supplement his response to include information thereafter acquired, except as
follows:

(1)

A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with respect to any
question directly addressed to (A) the identify and location of persons having
knowledge of discoverable matters, and (B) the identity of each person expected to
be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject matter on which he is expected to
testify, and the substance of his testimony.

(2)

(3)

/

'

A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he obtains
information upon the basis of which (A) he knows that the response was
incorrect when made, or (B) he knows that the response through correct when
made is no longer true and the circumstances are such that a failure to amend the
response is in substance a knowing concealment.

'

A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the court, agreement
of the parties, or at any time prior to trial through new requests for
supplementation of prior responses.

<

Rule 37(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(b)
(2)

Failure to comply with order.
Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a person or an officer, director
or managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30 (b)(6) or 31 (a)
to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery,
including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party
fails to obey an order entered under Rule 16(b), the court in which an action is
pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among
others the following:
(A)
an order that matters regarding which the order was made or any
other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party
obtaining the order;
(B)
an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support oppose
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing
designated matters in evidence;
4

i

<

(

(C)

(D)

(E)

an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further
proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party.
in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an
order treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any orders
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination;
where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 35(a),
such orders as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this
subdivision, unless the party failing to comply is unable to produce
such person for examination. In lieu of any of the foregoing orders
or in addition thereto, the court shall require the party failing to
obey the order or the attorney advising him or both to pay the
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure,
unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is the second of two lawsuits between Bruce Edwards (hereinafter Edwards) and
American Interstate Mortgage (hereinafter AIM) dealing with the parties' rights and
responsibilities under a promissory note and deed of trust secured by a home and real property
located at 4695 Burch Creek Drive, South Ogden, Utah. Both actions were brought in the
Second Judicial District Court of Weber County.
In the first suit, Bruce C. Edwards v. American Interstate Mortgage and Douglas M.
Durbano, Civil No. 940900438, Mr. Edwards brought suit against AIM and its successor trustee,
seeking declaratory judgment as to the rights of the parties and to enjoin a threatened nonjudicial
foreclosure of the trust deed. AIM in turn counterclaimed seeking to judicially foreclose on its
security and for attorney fees and other relief. Following AIM's motion for summary judgment,
the District Court denied the remedy of foreclosure as the secured party had failed to give
borrowers the notice of default and time to cure required in the promissory note. At trial, the

5

District Court granted judgment to the trust deed holder for $1210.56, representing two missing
monthly trust deed payments, while denying AIM's request for over $19,000.00 in attorney fees
and costs. The judgment was paid and satisfied by Mr. Edwards within the time ordered by the
court. No appeal was takenfromthe court'sfinaljudgment (R. at 392).
In this action, American Interstate again brought suit against Bruce C. Edwards seeking
judicial foreclosure of its trust deed on the South Ogden home, claiming a default in the non
payment often monthly payments of $700.65 each under the promissory note, along with court
costs and attorney fees. In addition, AIM sought to recover the $19,930.20 in attorney fees that
it was denied in the prior suit. After hearing on Edwards' motion to dismiss/summary judgment,
the trial court ruled that AIM's request for attorney fees incurred in the earlier suit was barred by
res judicata and collateral estoppel as to Bruce Edwards (R. at 099 and 205). Later, the action
was dismissed as to Bruce Edwards when it appeared that his interest in the property was
possessory only. His parents, James and Helen Edwards, the owners of the South Ogden home
were then joined in this action as parties defendant. (R. at 251). Upon cross motions for summary
judgment, the District Court allowed the suit to proceed against James and Helen Edwards on the
issues of the reasonableness of AIM's attorney fees and the type of notice required for judicial
foreclosure, ruling that claim for attorney fees in the prior suit would be allowed to the extent
they were found to be reasonable, as allowed under the terms of the trust deed (R. at 459).
At trial, the court determined that the property owners were not entitled to the notices
required under the note and trust deed as they had not directly assumed the trust deed and
allowed payment of $17,346.25 of the attorney fees claimedfromthe prior suit, along with
attorney fees and costs in the instant case. Also, as AIM had failed to provide billing records as
6

requested by Edwards in pretrial discovery, the court denied the admission of AIM's attorney
billing records for a period of approximately one year prior to the trial (R. at 653). The court
declined to award AIM certain of its attorney fees requested finding them to have been
I

unreasonable and unnecessarily incurred. All amounts awarded by the court were then paid by the
Edwards to prevent the sale of the property. AIM thereupon appealed the District Court's denial
of certain fees requested. James Edwards cross appealed seeking reversal of the court's award of
attorney fees, costs, and interest award by the court in both suits.
V. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 28,1981, James and Beverly Rothey purchased the home located at
4695 Burch Creek Drive, South Ogden, Utah, and in connection with said purchase signed a note
and deed of trust in favor of Mountain West Savings and Loan for $79,000.00 (R. at 007 and
009). Thereafter, on May 30,1985, pursuant to a Revision and Assumption Agreement, the
Rotheys transferred the property to Michael F. Flynn, who assumed the obligations of the trust
deed (R. at 013). Thereafter, the lender, Mountain West went into federal receivership and its
receiver, Resolution Trust Corporation, sold the note and trust deed to the plaintiff, American
Interstate Mortgage Corporation (hereinafter AIM), on May 2,1991 (R. at 015).
On July 15,1992, a civil judgment was entered against Michael E. Flynn in the Second
Judicial District Court of Weber County in favor of Bolt and Nut Supply Company, which
pursuant to a writ of execution, caused the Weber County Sheriff to levy upon and auction the
South Ogden home at sheriffs sale on August 18,1992 (R. at 020, 324). Judgment Collection
Systems, a Utah corporation, was the successful bidder at the sale, and on August 19,1992,
assigned its interest in the property to James W. Edwards and Helen F. Edwards, husband and
7

(

wife (hereinafter Edwards) (R. at 325). Following the redemption period, a sheriffs deed was
issued to the Edwards, as joint tenants (Exhibit "D 20"). The Edwards then leased the South
Ogden home to their son, Bruce Edwards, who has remained in possession thereafter and has at
all times acted as their authorized agent with respect to the property (R. at 325, 342, and 343).
A. First Litigation (Bruce C. Edwards vs. American Interstate et al.. Civil 940900438)

'

Subsequent to the sheriff sale, and consistent with the lease agreement with his parents,
Bruce Edwards contacted AIM and was informed that the loan payments, costs and late fees were
i
delinquent approximately $6400.00. The Edwards then paid these arrears and the Edwards
commenced making the regular monthly payments required under the note and trust deed to AIM,
through its servicing agent, First Commerce of America (R. at 327 to 329). Later, AIM

*

discontinued the services of First Commerce and payments were made directly to and accepted
without protest by AIM (R. at 331 332). AIM became aware of the interest of James and Helen
<

Edwards in the property and even introduced the Sheriffs Deed into evidence in the first trial.
Monthly payments were thereafter made and accepted by AIM until the summer of
1993, when a dispute arose between Bruce Edwards and AIM regarding missing payments

|

and/or late fees due. After an exchange of correspondence, in February of 1994, AIM demanded
payment of $2,924.86 and threatened foreclosure. To preclude the loss of the home, Bruce
4
Edwards on September 21, 1994, commenced suit in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber
County, State of Utah, in the matter of Bruce C. Edwards v. American Interstate Mortgage
Corporation and Douglas M. Durbano, Trustee, Civil No. 940900438, seeking equitable relief

(

enjoining nonjudicial foreclosure. AIM in turn counterclaimed seeking foreclosure of its trust
deed and other relief, including attorney fees. On October 4,1994, the District Court granted
I
8

Edwards' motion for a temporary restraining order enjoining nonjudicial foreclosure and ordered
Mr. Edwards to tender his monthly loan payments into court. Subsequently, these payments were
released to AIM pursuant to its motion to the court.
Later, in the Edwards v. American Interstate case, the lender moved for summary
judgment allowing its foreclosure of the South Ogden home, and after hearing, the District Court
denied summary judgment as AIM had failed to give the 30 day notice to cure any claim of
nonperformnce as required under the terms of the original note. Following several days of trial of
the issues, the District Court issued its Decision of January 28,1998, finding:
The court reaches the following conclusions. Mr. Edwards has not made the
mortgage payments for the months of June and July 1993. To bring the
account current it is necessary that these two payments be made. Despite the
mortgage company's numerous errors in determining what specific amounts were
owed under the note, it would not be fair to simply ignore the clear fact that Mr.
Edwards did not make these two payments ($605.28 each).
On the other hand, the mortgage company is not entitled to recover late fees and
interest on the past due amount. By their own conduct they are precluded as a
matter of equityfromreceiving the substantial sums they seek. The record is
replete with examples of conflicting statements as to what was owed. It would
be grossly unfair to require Mr. Edwards to pay penalties including interest when
the demands made upon him were so highly contradictory of each other and
inconsistent.
Because the two payments are owed, they are due and payable within 15 days
from the date of this Order. If they are not paid, then the mortgage company
is entitled to proceed anew with a foreclosure action (R. at 074).
While both parties plead and offered proof of significant attorney fees in this litigation,
none were awarded by the District Court. Further the two payments ($1210.56) were paid within
the 15 days as ordered by the court. No appeal was takenfromthisfinalorder.

9

B. Instant Litigation
Following the conclusion of the foregoing litigation, the Edwards fell behind on the
note payments, and mindful of the notice requirements of the promissory note, AIM sent its
demand letter of September 16, 1998 to Michael E. Flynn, assignee of the original borrower and
to the occupant of the South Ogden home (R. at 023). In this notice, wherein the borrower was
given 30 days to cure, AIM demanded not only payment often months payments totaling
$7,006.20, but also demanded payment of $19,930.20 together with interest, for attorney fees it
failed to be awarded in the first suit (R. at 024). Being disputed, the requested attorney fees were
not paid, but Edwards tendered the missing monthly payments of $7,006.50 by cashier's check to
the lender on October 23, 1998 (R. at 061 and 062). This check was held by AIM, but uncashed,

*

throughout most of the litigation and later returned to the Edwards.
On October 28,1998, AIM commenced this action by filing its complaint again seeking to
judicially foreclose its trust deed as a mortgage. Named as defendant was Bruce C. Edwards,
the owners' tenant and agent in possession of the property. All other defendants initially joined in
the action disclaimed any interest in the property or allowed their default to be entered. The only

<

answering defendant, excepting Bruce Edwards, was Ohio Casualty Insurance, which was later
defaulted owing to non appearance at trial.
4
In response to AIM's suit for foreclosure, Bruce Edwards filed his motion to dismiss/
summary judgment asserting the bars of res judicata and collateral estoppel to the new attempt
to recover the attorney fees denied in the previous litigation. After hearing, the District Court, on

4

March 31,1999, denied dismissal or summary judgment, but ruled that AIM's attempt to recover
the $19,930.20 in attorney fees from the prior litigation was barred (R. at 099, 169, 205).
I
10

Specifically, the court stated:
My opinion is, is if you couldn't collect it directly in a lawsuit brought with
him and you as a party, and she [Judge Heffernan} does not award it because
his interest is such it doesn't allow it, I don't see how you can make it a condition
on him in — in the foreclosure, nor do I see how you can go back now and say, Oh,
because we had to spend $19,000.00, which we couldn't collect directly from
him despite the fact we asked Judge Heffernan to, we now want to collect that
$ 19,000 as part of a separate action. My opinion is, at least in regards to Mr.
Edwards, you are foreclosed from obtaining — and whether it's collateral
estoppel — excuse me — collateral estoppel or whether or not it's res judicata,
I'm of the opinion that that $ 19,000 figure doesn't work (R. at 169).
Following this order, on July 7,1999, the court directed that James Edwards and Helen
Edwards, the owners of the South Ogden Home, be joined in the action as parties defendant
(R. at 235,251). AIM then filed its amended complaint joining James and Helen Edwards.
As his interest in the subject property was possessory only, the action was later dismissed as
to Bruce Edwards on March 22,2000 (R. at 451).
Prior to trial both AIM and Edwards filed cross motions for summary judgment and on
March 22,2000, after hearing argument on the motions, the District Court denied both motions,
but ruled that AIM could pursue at trial its previously incurred attorney fee claim against James
and Helen Edwards, rejecting the defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel as to them.
More particularly, the court narrowed the trial issues to:
1.

The nature and type of notice of default and/or delinquency and opportunity to
cure that the defendants James and Helen Edwards were entitled to receive and\or
what notice did they in fact receive.

2.

The reasonableness of costs and attorney fees sought by the plaintiff in this matter
and in a related matter
(R. at 460).

In preparation for trial, where the overriding issues were liability for and reasonableness
of AIM's attorney fees, in both a prior case and the instant case, Edwards, on April 9,1999,
11

submitted the following along with other discovery requests:
1.

Copies of all documents or other items that the plaintiff intends to introduce into
evidence upon the trial of the above matter.

In response to this request, on May 3,1999, AIM stated the following:
1.

Plaintiff has not yet designated documents for trial. Any and all documents which
Plaintiff intends to introduce into evidence at trial will be timely produced prior to
trial.

*

After this time, Edwards communicated another discovery request that including, among other
things, the following request for production of documents:
Request No. 7: All time slips, billings, and payment records, along with computer
records of the same, relative to the preparation, filing, and/or prosecution of the
present legal action (not to be confused with the companion Judge Heffernan matter)
(R. at 300).

*

<

The Edwards' second request for production of documents included, as did the first request, the
following instruction and admonition:
' i
The foregoing requests are continuing in nature and should be supplemented
with such further answers or documents as the same may become known or
available to plaintiff or his counsel (R. at 280).
In response to this request, AIM answered:

i

Response No. 7: Any documents responsive to this request will be produced for
inspection and copying at a mutually convenient time and place (R. at 300).
Additionally, AIM enclosed its August 12,1999 letter indicating that its responsive documents

<

were approximately 200 pages and invited Edwards to examine or copy the same. These items
were then delivered to Edwards for copying (R. at 303). Among the documents delivered were
the attorney billing statements current through June of 1999. No further billing statements were
tendered to or received by Edwards until the date of trial, notwithstanding the fact that AIM's
i
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counsel prepared and delivered the billings on a monthly basis. Owing to the failure of AIM
to supplement is discovery with its subsequent monthly attorney billings, at trial the District Court
disallowed the admission into evidence of monthly billings for the omitted pretrial period of
July 1999 through June 2000.
The District Court entered its Findings of Fact, Judgment, and Decree of Foreclosure on
September 20,2000, awarding AIM a total of $22,163.25 for attorney fees, costs and interest for
the first lawsuit. Additionally, AIM was awarded $12,488.41 for attorney fees, costs and interest
in the present action (R. at 652). AIM was denied its claimed attorney fees incurred between July
of 1999 and June 2000 in the amount of $11,456.95, owing to its failure to provide discovery,
along with other fees denied by the court. All amounts awarded by the court, including the
balance owing on the note, were paid and satisfied by the Edwards and received by AIM on
September 27,2000 (R. at 696).
On October 20,2000, AIMfiledits Notice of Appeal from the court's denial of certain
attorney fees and costs (R. at 677). James Edwards cross appealed,filinghis Notice of Appeal on
November 1, 2000, contesting the trial court's allowance of attorney fees and costsfromthe prior
and present litigation.
James Edwards died on November 14, 2000. Bruce Edwards was appointed personal
representative of the Estate of James Wesley Edward by order of the Second Judicial District
Court of Davis County, State of Utah, Probate No. 003700376, January 22,2001. The Utah
Supreme Court ordered that Bruce Edwards be substituted for the decedent James Edwards
pursuant to the parties' stipulation on February 8,2001. Helen Edwards predeceasing her
husband, had died shortly before the appeal was taken.
13

VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

The promissory note of August 28, 1981, requires that the borrower be given notice

of any delinquency and a 30 day period to cure as a precondition to accelerating the maturity of
the note. Since the lender failed to provided an effective notice that allowed the time within
which to cure, it was not entitled to accelerate the note and commence foreclosure.
II. The trust deed of August 28,1981 specifically requires that the lender give advance
notice to the borrower of its intention to incur attorney fees and other costs for the protection of
its interests in the security. The giving of such advance notice was a prerequisite to its entitlement
to recover such costs and fees. Since the lender failed to give such notice, it is now precluded
from recovering such expenses.
III. In an earlier lawsuit in the District Court of Weber County between Bruce Edwards
and AIM, the lender sought and was denied and equitably estopped from recovering $19,930.20 in
attorney fees, part of which it was awarded in the instant case. It was error for the trial court to
make such an award as this claim was barred by the doctrines of res judicata, issue preclusion,
collateral estoppel or equitable estoppel.
IV. During pretrial discovery, the Edwards requested the production of AIM's attorney
billing records. AIM responded indicating that it would furnish all records that it intended to use
at trial to the Edwards "prior to trial." Also, the trial court entered an order compelling discovery
of such documents and the Edwards again made a new request for the records with a second
request that records be updated and supplemented as new billings became available. When it
appeared at trial that AIM had failed to produce its billing recordsfromJune 30,1999 to July of
2000, the court properly disallowed the introduction of such items into evidence. The court's
14

refusal to allow the introduction of such records was proper under either the present Rule 26(e),
or an earlier version of Rule 26(e).
V.

AIM argues in its brief that the present version of Rule 26(e) does not apply to this

case due to the effective date of the amendments. This issue was never presented to the trial
court for its determination and therefore preserved in the trial record, and cannot now be raised
for the first time on appeal.
VI. AIM maintains in its brief that Bruce Edwards and/or James Edwards lack standing
to bring this appeal or oppose AIM's appeal, even though James and Helen Edwards were the
owners of the South Ogden home held as security under AIM's trust deed. AIM had actual
knowledge of their interest and even introduced the Sheriff s's Deed under which they acquired
the property in the first lawsuit. Further, pursuant to the order of the court, AIM joined James
and Helen Edwards as defendants in this action. James and Helen are now both deceased and
Bruce Edwards has been appointed by the District Court of Davis County, Utah, as personal
representative of the Estate of James Edwards. The trial court therefore properly rejected this
claim prior to the trial.
VII. ARGUMENT
POINT I
»

FORECLOSURE IS NOT AVAILABLE AS A REMEDY UNTIL THE
PROPER NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO CURE IS GIVEN
In this action, AIM commenced the second lawsuit to judicially foreclose its trust deed

as a mortgage as statutorily allowed under Utah Code Ann., Section 57-1-23, which allows this
procedure "at the option of the beneficiary," This approach has been specifically approved by the
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Utah Supreme Court. Security Title Co. v. Payless Builder's Supply, 407 P.2d 141 (Utah 1965).
In such an lawsuit, the rights and responsibilities of the parties to the action are governed by the
note and trust deed purchased by AIM. These two instruments constitute the contract documents
and must be read together in determining whether an acceleration provision is applicable.
American Savings & Loan Assoc, v. Blomquist, 445 P.2d 1 (Utah 1968). Further, while a secured
party is generally not required to give notice of default and time to cure before exercising an
acceleration option contained in the mortgage, it must do so when contractually required.
Johnston v. Austin, 748 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1988).
In this case, the trust deed note purchased by AIM and secured by the deed of trust on
the Edwards home contains, in paragraph 6, the following language:
6. BORROWERS'S FAILURE TO PAY AS REQUIRED
(B)
Notice from Note Holder
If I do not pay the fall amount of each monthly payment on time,
the Note Holder may send me a written notice telling me that if I do
not pay the overdue amount by a certain date I will be in default.
That date must be at least 30 days after the date on which the
notice is mailed to me.
(C)
Default
If I do not pay the overdue amount by the date stated in the notice
described in (B) above, I will be in default. If I am in default, the
Note Holder may require me to pay immediately the fall amount of
principal which has not been paid and all the interest that I owe on
that amount.
Accordingly, the obligor under the note is entitled to advance notice of any claimed
deficiency with a corresponding opportunity to cure within a 30 day period. Such notice is a
precondition to advancing the maturity of the note. Unless and until the notice is given, the note
holder is not entitled to the remedy of foreclosure, since "the objective of the notice requirements
is to protect the rights of those with an interest in the property to sold." Occidental/Nebraska
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Federal Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah Ct.App.1990); Jones vs. Johnson, 761
P.2d37(UtahCt.App.l998).
Clearly, AIM was aware of this notice requirement when its counsel mailed his default
letter of September 16,1998. This correspondence was furnished to the original note obligor and
to Bruce Edwards as the occupant of the property. The notice detailed the delinquent monthly
payments needed to cure, but also went on to wrongfully require performance not due under
the contract documents, namely, the following:
That the lenders security or interest in the property has become impaired due to
the bankruptcy of the debtor, abandonment of the property by the debtor, legal
actions filed by Bruce Edwards against the lender relating to his possessory
interest in the subject property requiring Lender, pursuant to 6(D) and 7 of the
Trust deed, to make disbursements including costs and reasonable attorney fees
in the amount of $19,930.20 to protect Lender's interest. This amount is hereby
declared due and payable within (30) days of the date of this notice, plus interest
thereon at the rate payable on the outstanding principal under the Note.
The claimed $19,930.20 was, of course, the same attorney fees and costs that AIM sought
unsuccessfully from the District Court in the first litigation with Bruce Edwards, and from
which judgment AIM did not appeal. Nevertheless, under this notice, for the property owners,
James and Helen Edwards, to cure, they would have to pay the missing payments and also pay the
disputed attorney fees and costs earlier denied by the first court. Furthermore, the amount
claimed ($19,930.20) even exceeded the amount ultimately allowed by the District Court in this
litigation ($17346.25 with interest). The default notice, demanding considerably greater payments
than allowed under the note, was accordingly defective in a material manner. Such a notice
effectively denied the property owners of their right and opportunity to cure the default. As a
proper notice was never provided, AIM was not entitled to accelerate the maturity of the debt and

IT

i
proceed with the remedy of foreclosure.
POINTII

{

ATTORNEY FEES ARE NOT AVAILABLE UNDER THE TRUST DEED
UNLESS THE SECURED PARTY FURNISHES THE NOTICE
REQUIRED BY THE TRUST DEED
Paragraph 7 of the August 28, 1981, trust deed provides the secured party with the
following remedies:
7.

Protection of Lender's Security. If Borrower fails to perform the covenants and
agreements contained in this Deed of Trust, or if any action or proceeding is
commenced which materially affects Lender's interest in the Property, including
but not limited to eminent domain, insolvency, code enforcement, or arrangements
or proceedings involving a bankrupt or decedent, then Lender at Lender's option
upon notice to Borrower, may make such appearances, disburse such sums and
take such action as is necessary to protect Lender's interest, including, but not
limited to, disbursement of reasonable attorney's fees . . .(Emphasis added).

Similar to the default provisions of the promissory note, the trust deed requires as a
precondition to incurring costs and attorney fees, that AIM, as the secured party, give prior

*

notice to the borrower. The obvious purpose of this notice requirement is to allow the borrower
an opportunity to eliminate the default or resolve the threat to the lender's security. As
(

previously noted by this court, such "detailed procedural requirements for a trustee's sale of real
property are intended to protect the debtor/trustor" or those with an interest in the property to be
sold. Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37, 41 (Utah Ct.App.1988). See Occidental/Nebraska

<

Federal Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah Ct.App. 1990).
Contrary to the requirements of the foregoing trust deed provisions, AIM never gave any
advance notice to the note maker, subsequent assignee, or the property owners prior to engaging
legal counsel and incurring the attorney fees and costs in the first lawsuit. In fact, it was
i
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this failure that led the trial court in the first case to deny AIM the right to foreclose, judicially or
otherwise. More importantly, these attorney fees were incurred by AIM as a consequence of
its own wrongful threats of foreclosure and in otherwise threatening or seeking relief to which
it was not legally entitled. As held by the trial court, the necessity of the litigation was in large
part due to the lender's highly "contradictory and inconsistent" demands. AIM was therefore
equitably estopped by its own misconduct from recovering the late fees, interest and fees it
sought. Accordingly, having failed to comply with the notice requirements of its own trust deed,
AIM cannot now be allowed to recover attorney fees it claims to have incurred in protecting its
security. It cannot claim the benefits of the contract provision (Paragraph 7) while at the same
time ignoring the burdens it imposes.
POINTIII
THE CLAIM FOR $19,930.20 IN ATTORNEY FEES AND COURT COSTS IS
BARRED BY THE DOCTRINES OF RES JUDICATA, COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL, AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
In the earlier case of Bruce Edwards v. American Interstate Mortgage, Mr. Edwards,
individually and as managing agent for his parents, commenced suit to restrain the nonjudicial
trust deed sale of the South Ogden home and property in which he had a possessory interest, as
lessee. Essentially treating him as the property owner, as it long had during his performance of
the note and trust deed, AIM counterclaimed for the judicial foreclosure of its trust deed, also
seeking its court costs and attorney fees incurred in that proceeding. That case involved the same
parties as initially joined in the instant case. It involved the same note and trust deed and the same
real property. In its Answer and Counterclaim, AIM specifically prayed for "[defendant's costs
and attorney's fees in defending the Complaint," and for "collection costs, reasonable attorney's
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fees and costs of court herein." At trial, AIM made a proffer of its attorney fees and sought the
introduction of evidence as to its attorney fees and costs, as did Mr. Edwards. In its final
decision, however, the District Court awarded attorney fees to neither party. No appeal was
taken from this ruling.
As with attorney fees, the trial court denied AIM late fees and interest claimed under the
note and trust deed, specifically holding:
By their conduct they [AIM] are precluded as a matter of equity from receiving the
substantial sums they seek. The record is replete with examples of conflicting
statements as to what was owed. It would be grossly unfair to require Mr. Edwards
to pay penalties including interest when the demands made upon him were so highly
contradictory of each other and inconsistent (Emphasis added).
Basically, the trial court found that AIM was equitably estopped by its own misconduct from
recovering the substantial sums sought as interest, late fees, attorney fees, or other relief. The
question of AIM's entitlement to attorney fees and costs incurred in that proceeding is therefore
now barred by the doctrines of equitable estoppel, res judicata, issue preclusion or collateral
estoppel.
These doctrines serve the important public policy of providing finality to the judicial

<

process by preventing previously litigated issues and claims from being relitigated. Jones, Waldo,
Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1966); Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d
1178 (Utah 1993). See also Berry v. Berry 738 P.2d 246 (Utah Ct.App.1987); and Estate of
Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675 (Utah Ct.App. 1995).
In the 1996 case of Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996) the Utah Supreme Court
reaffirmed the four requirements previously set forth in Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc.,
669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983) that must be met for the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue
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(

preclusion to apply:
First, the issue in both cases must be identical. Second, the judgment must be
final with respect to that issue. Third, the issue must have been fully, fairly,
and competently litigation in the first action. Fourth, the party who is precluded
from litigating the issue must be either a party to the first action or a privy of a
party. Penrod at 875.
Sevy v. Security Title Co., 903 P.2d 629 (Utah 1995); Maoris & Assoc, Inc. v. Neways, Inc.
986 P.2d 748 (Utah Ct.App. 1999).
In applying the Penrod criteria to the fact of this case, it will be seen that in both the prior
action and the suit now on appeal, the identical issue is AIM's entitlement to recover its attorney
fees and costs. Final judgment was entered in the District Court which denied these fees. The
matter of attorney fees was litigated in the first case and the parties both had a full and fair
opportunity to try that claim. Lastly, the party to be precluded from relitigating the attorney
fee issue, American Interstate Mortgage, was an adverse party in both suits. As all the necessary
requirements are fully met, the fee issue is now precluded and AIM is collaterally estopped from
reasserting it in a separate action. See Richards v. Hodson, 485 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1971);
Progressive Acquisition Inc., v. Lytle, 806 P.2d 239 (Utah Ct.App.1991).
Similar to the doctrine of collateral estoppel is that of res judicata, which bars the
relitigation of certain claims. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Schaer v. State ex rel.
UDOT, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983), reaffirming Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah
1978):
In order for res judicata to apply, both suits must involve the same parties or their
privies and also the same cause of action: and this precludes relitigation of all issues
that could have been litigated as well as those that were in fact litigated in the prior
action. Schafer 1340.
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Similarly, this court detailed these requirements in Am. Estate Mgt. v. Intern. Inv. & Dev.,
986 P.2d 765 (Utah Ct.App.1999) as follows:
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action only if the suit in which that cause of
action is being asserted and the prior suit satisfy three requirements. First,
both cases must involve the same parties, or their privies. Second, the claim that
is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or must be one
that could and should have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit
must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
Applying the foregoing criteria it will be seen that both cases involved the same parties or
their privies. AIM was a party in each action, as was Bruce Edwards. Further, Bruce Edwards
was at all times the tenant in possession and management agent for James and Helen Edwards.
By court order he now acts as personal representative for the estate of his late father and has been
appointed as substitute party in this appeal. Further, the cause of action for attorney fees, is the
same in both lawsuits. Lastly, the issue of attorney fees could have been and was litigated in the
{

prior action, and that prior action resulted in a final judgment. In re J J. T., 877 P.2d 161 (Utah
Ct.App.1994); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988); Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork
Pipeline Corporation, 913 P.2d 731 (Utah 1995). See also, PGM, Inc., v. Westchester
(

Investment Partners, Ltd., 995 P.2d 1252 (Utah Ct.App.2000); Collins v. Sandy City Board of
Adjustment, 16 P.3d 1251 (Utah Ct.App.2000).
The same equitable considerations presently apply in the instant case that the trial court

<

found to have equitably estopped AIMfromobtaining the relief it sought, namely, the repeated
conflicting statements, requests, and demands upon the homeowner that "were so highly
contradictory of each other and inconsistent."
Accordingly, under the long recognized principles of equitable estoppel, res judicata, issue
<
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preclusion or collateral estoppel, AIM is now estopped and precluded from again litigating the
attorney fees and costs it expended in the initial suit.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF
ATTORNEY FEES FOR THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE DISCOVERY
WAS WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE COURT
During the pretrial discovery period in this action, Edwards submitted certain discovery
requests to AIM on April 9,1999, consisting of a request for production of documents and
interrogatories. Among other items, Edwards requested the following:
1.

Copies of all documents or other items that the plaintiff intends to introduce into
evidence upon the trial of the above matter.

This discovery request ended with the request "The foregoing requests are continuing in nature
and should be updated as future circumstances may require (Emphasis added). In response to
this request, AIM responded on May 3,1999, as follows:
1.

Plaintiff has not yet designated documents for trial. Any and all documents which
Plaintiff intends to introduce into evidence at trial will be timely produced prior
to trial (Emphasis added).

Believing this and other responses to discovery to be insufficient and inadequate, Edwards filed
his motion to compel discovery and following a hearing on July 7,1999, the District Court
entered the following discovery order:
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED that the plaintiff
shall be and is hereby ordered to fully answer and comply with the defendant's
Request for Production of Documents and Interrogatories served by defendant
Edwards on or about the 9th of April, 1999, in the above matter. Specifically,
the plaintiff shall answer and comply with paragraphs 1 , . . . [quoted above]
(Emphasis added).
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Owing to the inadequacy AIM's initial response to discovery, the court went on the enter the
further order:
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED that the trial date
heretofore set in the matter for the 27th of July, 1999, shall be and is hereby
stricken. The matter shall not be reset for trial until discovery by the parties has
been completed and additional parties have been properly joined consistent with
this order.
Following the entry of this order, Edwards again on July 7, 1999, sent AIM the following
additional interrogatories and requests for production of documents:
7.

All time slips, billings, and payment records, along with computer records of the
same, relating to the preparation,filing,and/or prosecution of the present legal
action (not to be confused with the companion Judge Heffernan matter).

8.

All documents that the plaintiff or his counsel intend to introduce into evidence at
the trial of the matter, not previously furnished to defendant as part of the court
order compelling discovery.

Again the discovery ended with the admonition and request:
The foregoing request are continuing in nature and should be supplemented
with such further answers or documents as the same may become known or
available to plaintiff or his counsel (Emphasis added).
Thereafter, on August 12,1999, in response the court's order compelling discovery, AIM made
the following response to Edwards' initial request:
1.

All documents responsive to this request will be produced at a mutually convenient
time and place for inspection and copying.

On the same date, AIM responded to Edwards' follow-up discovery requests with the
following:
7.

Any documents responsive to this request will be produced for inspection and
copying at a mutually convenient time and place.
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8.

Any documents responsive to this request will be produced for inspection and
copying at a mutually convenient time and place.

Subsequent to the above exchange, and pursuant to its August 12,1999 letter, AIM delivered to
Edwards a large number of documents for inspection and copying. These documents included
copies of the computer billing statements of AIM's counsel as prepared and delivered to the
client on a monthly basis. Such billings were current through June of 1999. Even though the
monthly billings of AIM's counsel were supplied to it regularly each month, no further records
were furnished to Edwards nor made available to him until the morning of trial, July 18,2000.
As a consequence of the foregoing, and upon Edwards' objection, the trial court denied the
admission of a number of AIM's attorney billing records subsequent to June 30,1999.
Rule 26(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a reasonable construction of the
court's order compelling discovery, and AIM's own answer required that AIM update its
response by making its billing records available to Edwards in a timely manner. As noted, in its
initial response, AIM specifically stated that any documents it intended to use at trial "will be
timely produce prior to trial."
Rule 26(e) provides the following:
(e)

Supplementation of responses. A party who has made a disclosure under
subdivision (a) or responded to a request for discovery with a response is under a
duty to supplement the disclosure or response to include information thereafter
acquired if ordered by the court or in the following circumstances:

(1)

A party is under a duty to supplement at appropriate intervals disclosures under
Subdivision (a) if the party learn that in some material respect the information
disclosed is incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or corrective information
has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery
process or in writing. With respect to testimony of an expert witnessfromwhom a
report is required under Subdivision (a)(3)(B) the duty extends both to information
contained in the report and to information provided through a deposition of the
25
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expert.
(2)

A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response to an interrogatory,
request for production, or request for admission if the party leans that the response
is in some material respect incomplete or incorrect and if the additional or
corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties
during the discovery process or in writing.

{

In the pretrial discovery process, Edwards asked on two separate occasions for the
documents that AIM intended to use as exhibits at trial, on each instance requesting the response
be updated. Upon AIM's initial refusal to provide these documents, the court ordered that AIM
"fully answer and comply" with this request. Since the basic thrust of the action was the recovery
of attorney fees in the instant and past case, it must have been obvious to AIM that it would seek
the introduction and use at trial of its attorney billing statements. Failure to provide them as they
were produced violated not only the express provisions of Rule 26(e), U.R.C.P., but also the
order of the court.
Furthermore, even if a prior version of Rule 26(e), URCP applied to this action, the court
properly excluded the use at trial of the documents and exhibits not furnished in discovery. It
will be noted that the earlier version of the rule provides as follows:
(e)

Supplementation of responses. A party who has responded to a request for
discovery with a response that was complete when made is under no duty to
supplement his response to include information thereafter acquired, except as
follows:
(2)

A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he
obtains information upon the basis of which (A) he knows that the
response was incorrect when made, or (B) he known that the
response through correct when made is no longer true and the
circumstances are such that a failure to amend the response is in
substance a knowing concealment.

(3)

A duty to supplement responses may be imposed by order of the
26
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court, agreement of the parties, or at any time prior to trial
through new requests for supplementation of prior responses
(Emphasis added).
Here, as each month went by, a new billing statement was prepared and presented to AIM
by its counsel for which it intended to seek recovery at trial. AIM had the responsibility even
under the earlier version of Rule 26(e), U.R.C.P. to make new computer billings available to the
adverse party to update and correct the amount of fees it would ultimately seek at trial.
Additionally, AIM was under a specific order of the court to "folly answer and comply" with
Edwards' requests, as detailed in subparagraph (3) above and Edwards had made a " request for
supplementation of prior responses" in the initial request of April 9, 1999. Again, on July 7,
1999, some three months later and a foil year before the trial, Edwards made the second and a
"new request" for the supplementation of discovery. Owing to AIM's failure to have provided
the material ordered and requested, the court acted within its sound discretion in denying AIM's
request to introduce into evidence material not furnished. Such action is specifically authorized
under Rule 37(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in pertinent part:
If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including
an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule . . . the court in which the
action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and
among others the following:
(B) an order . . . prohibiting him from introducing designated matters
in evidence (Emphasis added).
POINT V
AIM RAISES THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AMENDMENTS TO RULE 26(e) FOR THE
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
Interestingly, AIM asserts that the existing provisions of Rule 26(e), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure do not apply to this case as the action was filed prior to November 1,1999,
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but tried in July of 2000. A review of the trial record will demonstrate, however, that AIM
never urged at trial or brought to the trial court's attention the effective date of the amendments
to Rule 26(e), but raises this issue for the first time on appeal.
During the trial, Edwards objected to the introduction of AIM's attorney billing records for
he reasons noted above. In response to the objection, AIM's counsel stated:
If he really had an issue with that, I think that he should have at least called or
dropped a letter or something, and we would have been more than happy to send
these off whenever he asked. It's something that- - like I said, I didn't go through
the file again and review all of this discovery requests. (T. at 73).

{

Never did AIM argue or suggest that it had no duty to furnish discovery under one version of the
rule or another. Never did it maintain that one version applied rather than another. At no time
was the trial court given any opportunity to consider this argument or request.
Under such circumstances, this court has repeatedly held:
It is axiomatic that matters not presented to the trial court may not be raised
for the first time on appeal. Franklin Fin. v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d
1040,1044 (Utah 1983), quoted with approval in Progressive Acquisition, Inc.
v. Lytle, 806 P.2d 239,242 (Utah Ct.App. 1991).
Again, this court has observed:

{
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We are governed by the general principle that we may not address issues that are
raised for the first time on appeal. Western Farm Credit Bank v. Pratt, 860 P.2d
376, 378 (Utah Ct.App.1993) quoting with approval Ong intern. (U.S.A.) v. 11th
Ave Corp., 850 P.2d 447,455 (Utah 1993) ("Failure to raise the point [below]
precludes its consideration here.").

1

Accordingly, since the District Court was never asked to consider the effective date of the recent
amendments to Rule 26(e), U.R.C.P., or the amendments applicability to this action, it would
violate fundamental principles of appellate review to consider it here.
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ISSUE VI
THE ESTATE OF JAMES EDWARDS AS OWNER OF THE REAL
PROPERTY HAS PROPER STANDING TO DEFEND THE FORECLOSURE
AND TO BRING THIS APPEAL
As noted in the Certificate of Sale (Exhibit D21), Michael Flynn's interest in the South
Ogden home and real property was sold at sheriffs sale on August 18,1992. Judgment
Collection Systems, a Utah corporation, was the successful bidder at the sale. After the
redemption period, the property was assigned and transferred to James W. Edwards and Helen F.
Edwards, as joint tenants, by the Sheriffs Deed (Exhibit D20). AIM was well aware of the
interest of James and Helen and had actual knowledge of their interest as it had received
numerous monthly paymentsfromthis. Further, AIM even introduced into evidence the Sheriffs
Deed under which their ownership interest arose in the first lawsuit between Bruce Edwards and
AIM. Because of their ownership interest in the property, being well known to AIM in both the
prior and the present litigation, the trial court granted their motion to intervenefindingthem to be
the real parties in interest and their presence in the action being necessary to a full and just
adjudication of the claims pursuant to Rules 17 and 19, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Mr. James Edwards acquired the interest of his wife, the joint tenant, upon her death, by
operation of law, and was therefore the sole owner of the real property upon his death November
14, 2000, subject to the trust deed and other claims of record. On January 22,2001 the Second
Judicial District Court of Davis County, State of Utah, in the Matter of the Estate of James
Wesley Edwards, Probate No. 003700376 duly admitted his last will to probate and appointed
Bruce Edwards as personal representative of the estate. Thereafter, and upon written stipulation
of the parties, on February 8,2001, the Utah Supreme Court entered its order pursuant to Rule
29
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25, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, substituting Bruce Edwards in place of the decedent.
Based on the foregoing it is rather difficult to understand the claim made that the Estate of

,

James Edwards lacks standing to bring or oppose this appeal.
IV. CONCLUSION
The rights and interests of American Interstate Mortgage Company arise under the terms
and conditions of a promissory note and deed of trust that it purchased from the federal receiver
of Mountain West Savings and Loan. Under the terms of the promissory note, AIM was
obligated to provide the borrower with advance notice of any nonperformance and a 30 day
opportunity to cure. Under the terms of the deed of trust, AIM was required to give advance
notice to the borrower of its intention to incur and pay attorney fees and other costs as a
precondition to recovering these expenses. Having failed to give the notices required under the
contract documents, AIM is precluded from the remedy of judicial foreclosure and is not entitled
to recover its attorney fees or costsfromthe prior or the present lawsuit. It was therefore error
for the District Court to allow judicial foreclosure and to have awarded attorney fees from the
past or present litigation. The Judgment of the District Court allowing foreclosure and awarding
costs and attorney fees should therefore be reversed, and the claim dismissed.
In an earlier lawsuit to which AIM was a party defendant and counterclaiming, it sought
attorney fees and costs along with the judicial foreclosure of its security. In that action, the trial
court denied the remedy of foreclosure, denied AIM its attorney fees, costs and other relief
finding that it was equitably estopped by its own conductfromrecovering the substantial sums
that it sought. No appeal was takenfromthatfinaljudgment. As a consequence, AIM is now
precluded by the long recognized doctrines of res judicata, issue preclusion, collateral estoppel
30
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and equitable estoppel from recovering these sums in the subsequent lawsuit. Accordingly, it was
error for the trial court to have awarded any portion of AIM's costs and attorney feesfromthe
prior lawsuit, and the District Court's Judgment granting these attorney fees and costs should be
reversed, and the claim dismissed.
During the trial below, the District Court properly denied the admission of certain attorney
billing records of AIM owing to its violation of an order compelling discovery and AIM's own
response to discovery, indicating that it would produce such documents prior to trial. Therefore
the trial court's action was proper under an earlier or present version of Rule 26(e). Moreover, as
AIM never raised that issue at trial it cannot now raise it for the first time on appeal. The trial
court's order denying admissibility of these should therefore Jzfe affirmed
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of July, 200 L

^KJ^qWLTON
fttttfrne/for Bruce Edwards, Personal
Representative of the Estate of James Edwards
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ADDENDUM
I

A. Note of August 28,1981
B. Deed of Trust of August 28, 1981
C. Decisionof January 28,1998
D. Judgment and Order (Compelling Discovery) of July 26,1999
E. Certificate of Sale
F. Sheriffs Deed
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NOTICE TO BORROWER:. THIS N O t E CONTAINS A PROVISION ALLOWING FOR
CHANGES IN THE INTEREST RATE. INCREASES IN THE INTEREST RATE WILL
RESULT IN HIGHER PAYMENTS. DECREASES IN THE INTEREST RATE WILL
RESULT IN LOWER PAYMENTS.
AUGUST. 28JH

19.8.1

4695. BURCH. CREEK.DRIVE.. .SOUTH .OGDEN
Property Address
1.

City

OGDEN
City

UTAH
State

UTAH
State

84403
Zip Code

BORROWER'S PROMISE TO PAY
In return for a loan that I have received, I promise to pay US $.79»Q0Qi0Q
(this amount will be
called "principal"), plus interest, to the order of the Lender. The Lender is
..MQ.UNTAJWWWJ.?AVIN.Q5.ANP.WAN
I understand that the Lender may transfer this Note. The Lender or anyone who takes this Note by transfer and
who is entitled to receive payments under this Note will be called the "Note Holder".
2. INTEREST
Interest will be charged on that part of principal which has not been paid. Interest will be charged beginning on the
date of this Note and continuing until the full amount of principal has been paid.
Starting on the date of this Note, I will pay interest at a yearly rate of . . . 12.-1./?
% (the "Initial Interest
Rate"). The interest rate that I will pay will change in accordance with Section 5 of this Note until my loan is paid. Interest rate changes may occur on the .. .1ST.. day of
FEBRUARY
in 1985. . . and on that
day in that month every . . . . THREE. ( 3 )
years thereafter (the "Change Date").
The interest rate that I pay will not be changed by more than .!.«$
percentage points on any Change Date.
The interest rate that I pay may never be increased to more than .1.7?J/2. % or decreased to less than 7."'./?.. %
during the period I have my loan.
3. THIS NOTE SECURED BY A DEED OF TRUST
In addition to the protections given to the Note Holder under this Note, a Deed of Trust, dated
AUGUST. .?8J.H
, 19.81 . . , protects the Note Holder from possible losses which might result if I
do not keep the promises which I make in this Note. That Deed of Trust describes how and under what conditions I
may be required to make immediate payment in full of all amounts that I owe under this Note.
4. PAYMENTS
(A) Time and Place of Payments
I will pay principal and interest by making payments every month. I will make my monthly payments on the
.1ST. day of each month beginning on .OCTOBER. 1ST
.,19.8.1. . . . I will make my monthly
payments at . . . .240.6. .WASHINGTON .BOULEVARD., .06D£N,. UTAH.. 84401
or at a different place if required by the Note Holder. I will make these payments until I have paid all of the principal
and interest and any other charges, described below, that I may owe under this Note. I will pay all sums that I owe
under this Note no later than . .SEPTEMBER .1ST
20.11 . . (the "final payment date").
(B) Borrower's Payments Before They Are Due
I have the right to make payments of principal at any time before they are due. A payment of principal only is
known as a "prepayment". When I make a prepayment, I will tell the Note Holder in a letter that I am doing so. I may
make a full prepayment or a partial prepayment without paying any penalty. The Note Holder will use all of my
prepayments to reduce the amount of principal that I owe under this Note. If I make a partial prepayment, there will be
no delays in the due dates of my monthly payments unless the Note Holder agrees in writing to those delays. My partial
prepayment will reduce the amount of my monthly payments after the first Change Date following my partial prepayment. However, any reduction due to my partial prepayment may be offset by an interest rate increase.
(C) Amount of Monthly Payments
My initial monthly payments will be in the amount of US $. 843 • 14
If the interest rate that
I pay changes, the amount of my monthly payments will change. Increases in the interest rate will result in higher
payments (unless my prepayments since the last Change Date offset the increases in my monthly payments). Decreases
in the interest rate will result in lower payments. The amount of my monthly payments will always be sufficient to repay
my loan in full in substantially equal payments by the final payment date. In setting the monthly payment amount on
each Change Date, the Note Holder will assume that the Note interest rate will not change again prior to the final payment date.
5. INTEREST RATE CHANGES
(A) The Index
Any changes in the interest rate will be based on changes in a measure of the cost of home mortgage loans
called the "Index". The Index is the "Contract Interest Rate, Purchase of Previously Occupied Homes, National
Average for all Major Types of Lenders" made available by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. If the Index ceases to
be made available by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, or by any successor to it, (he Note Holder will set the Note
interest rate by using a comparable national index.
(B) Setting the New Interest Rate
To set the new interest rate, the Note Holder will first determine a "preliminary rate". The preliminary
rate will reflect the change between the most recent Index figure available on . . . JULY. 3.15T
, 19. 6.1..
(the "Base Index figure") and the most recent Index figure available on the .3QTHday of
SEPTEMBER
. .prior to each Change Date (the "current Index figure").
If the current Index figure is larger than the Base Index figure, the Note Holder will add the amount of the
change to the Initial Interest Rate. If the current Index figure is smaller than the Base Index figure, the Note Holder will
subtract the amount of the change from the Initial Interest Rate. The result of this addition or subtraction will be the
preliminary rate. If there is no change between the Base Index figure and the current Index figure, the Initial Interest
Rate will be the preliminary rate.
Next, the Note Holder will adjust the preliminary rate so that:
(i)
the change in the interest rate on any Change Date will not be more than . 1 . 5 . percentage points; and
(ii) the new interest rate will not be more than . 5 , 0 . percentage points higher or lower than the Initial
Interest Rate.

Effective Date of Changes ,,,
«x*
feach new interest rate will become effective on the next Change Date. If my monthly payment changes as a
result of a change in the interest rate, my monthly payment will change as of the first monthly payment date after the
Change Date.
(D) Notice to Borrower
The Note Holder will mail me a notice by first class mail (which may be certified) at least 90 days before each
Change Date during the period I have my loan. The notice will include:
(i)
a statement that my loan interest rate is scheduled to be adjusted on the next Change Date;
(ii) a statement that if I do not pay my loan in full by the next Change Date, the interest rate on my loan
will be adjusted;
(iii) the interest rate that will apply to my loan for the period beginning with the next Change Date;
(iv) the amount of my monthly payment of principal and interest after the next Change Date;
(v) the date of my first monthly payment after the next Change Date;
(vi) a statement of what the principal balance of my loan will be on the next Change Date assuming I make
my regular monthly payments;
(vii) a reminder that there is no penalty if I pay off my entire loan or a part of it on the next Change Date or
at any other time; and,
(viii) the title and telephone number of an employee who will answer my questions regarding the notice.
6. BORROWER'S FAILURE TO PAY AS REQUIRED
(A) Late Charge for Overdue Payments
If the Note Holder has not received the full amount of any of my monthly payments by the end of .15
calendar days after the date it is due, I will pay a late charge to the Note Holder. The amount of the charge will be
. 4 . 0 - . . Vo of my overdue payment of principal and interest. I will pay this late charge only once on any late payment.
(B) Notice from Note Holder
If I do not pay the full amount ofreaflLmonthly payment on time, the Note Holder may send me a written
notice telling me that if I do not pay the ovfajue. afmuint by a certain date I will be in default. That date must be at least
30 days after the date on which the notice ^hia/leiHto me.
(C) Default
^ ^ J ^
If I do not pay the overdue amount byfrife\rfj^stated in the notice described in (B) above, I will be in default.
If I am in default, the Note Holder may require m«w$fiWmmediately the full amount of principal which has not been
paid and all the interest that I owe on that amount.
&\0foL.
Even if, at a time when I am in default, the4*ote HJjgjJer does not require me to pay immediately in full as
described above, the Note Holder will still have the right Jg^oo^^if I am in default at a later time.
(D) Payment of Note Holder's Costs and E x p e n s e s V \ ^ $
If the Note Holder has required me to pay immediaUd$Mr™l as described above, the Note Holder will have
the right to be paid back by me for all its reasonable costs and cranises to the extent not prohibited by applicable law.
Those expenses may include, for example, reasonable attorneys fees.
7. WAIVERS
Anyone who signs this Note to transfer it to someone else (known as an "endorser") waives certain rights. Those
rights are (A) the right to require the Note Holder to demand payment of amounts due (known as "presentment") and
(B) the right to require the Note Holder to give notice that amounts due have not been paid (known as "notice of
dishonor").
8. GIVING OF NOTICES
Except for the notice provided in Section 5(D), any notice that must be given to me under this Note will be given by
mailing it by certified mail. All notices will be addressed to me at the Property Address above. Notices will be mailed to
me at a different address if I give the Note Holder a notice of my different address.
Any notice that must be given to the Note Holder under this Note will be given by mailing it by certified mail to the
Note Holder at the address stated in Section 4(A) above. Notices will be mailed to the Note Holder at a different address
if I am given a notice of that different address.
9. RESPONSIBILITY OF PERSONS UNDER THIS NOTE
If more than one person signs this Note, each of us is fully and personally obligated to pay the full amount owed
and to keep all of the promises made in this Note. Any guarantor, surety, or endorser of this Note is also obligated to do
these things. The Note Holder may enforce its rights under this Note against each of us individually or against all of us
together. This means that any one of us may be required to pay all of the amounts owed under this Note.
Any person who takes over my rights or obligations under this Note will have all of my rights and must keep all of
my promises made in this Note. Any person who takes over the rights or obligations of a guarantor, surety, or endorser
of this Note is also obligated to keep all of the promises made in this Note.
10. LOAN CHARGES
It could be that this loan is subject to a law which sets maximum loan charges and that law is interpreted so that the
interest or other loan charges collected or to be collected in connection with this loan would exceed permitted limits. If
this is the case, then: (A) any such loan charge shall be reduced by the amount necessary to reduce the charge to the permitted limit; and (B) any sums already collected from me Which exceeded permitted limits will be refunded to me. The
Note Holder may choose to make this refund by reducing the principal I owe under this Note or by making a direct payment to me. If a refund reduces principal, the reduction will be treated as a partial prepayment.
(C)

/foi*1<<44.,.

^7/....

^aO&^hL/zf'

(Seal)

.(Seal)

(Seal)
Borrower
(Sign Original Only)

RIDER
NOTICE: THE SECURITY INSTRUMENT SECURES A NOTE WHICH CONTAINS
A PROVISION ALLOWING FOR CHANGES IN THE INTEREST RATE. INCREASES IN THE INTEREST RATE WILL RESULT IN HIGHER PAYMENTS.
DECREASES IN THE INTEREST RATE WILL RESULT IN LOWER PAYMENTS.
This Rider is made this .28TH . . day of AUGUST
, 19.81 . . , and is incorporated into and shall
be deemed to amend and supplement the Mortgage, Deed of Trust, or Deed to Secure Debt (the "Security Instrument") of the same date given by the undersigned (the "Borrower") to secure Borrower's Note to

..MOWNTAMWEST. SAVINGS. ANP. WAN
(the "Lender") of the same date (the "Note") and covering the property described in the Security Instrument and
located at
4695. .BURCH .CREEK.DRIVE,. SOUTH. .QGDEN, .UTAH . .84.4.03
Property Address

Modifications. In addition to the covenants and agreements made in the Security Instrument, Borrower and
Lender further covenant and agree as follows:
A. INTEREST RATE AND MONTHLY PAYMENT CHANGES
The Note has an "Initial Interest Rate" o f . J 2.-.1 /.2 . . . °7o. The Note interest rate may be increased or decreased
on each Change Date, as described in the Note. Changes in the interest rate are governed by changes in the "Contract
Interest Rate, Purchase of Previously Occupied Homes, National Average for all Major Types of Lenders" made
available by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (the "Index"). The interest rate cannot be changed to more than
. 5 - 0 . percentage points higher or lower than the Initial Interest Rate.
If the interest rate changes, the amount of Borrower's monthly payments will change as provided in the Note. Increases in the interest rate will result in higher payments. Decreases in the interest rate will result in lower payments.
B. LOAN CHARGES
It could be that the loan secured by the Security Instrument is subject to a law which sets maximum loan charges
and that law is interpreted so that the interest or other loan charges collected or to be collected in connection with the
loan would exceed permitted limits. If this is the case, then: (A) any such loan charge shall be reduced by the amount
necessary to reduce the charge to the permitted limit; and (B) any sums already collected from Borrower which exceeded permitted limits will be refunded to Borrower. Lender may choose to make this refund by reducing the principal
owed under the Note or by making a direct payment to Borrower.

C. TRANSFER OF THE PROPERTY
If there is a transfer of the Property subject to paragraph 17 of the Security Instrument, Lender may require
either an increase in the current Note interest rate or an increase in the Base Index figure, or both, as a condition of
Lender waiving the option to accelerate provided in paragraph 17.
By signing this, Borrower agrees to all of the above.

JAMES M. ROTHEY

/?

/

. ./DMMACU...

BEVERLY pTHEY

ADJUSTABLE RATE LOAN RIDER-i
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DEED OF TRUST
THIS DEED OF TRUST is made this
?PXM
day of. . AUG U.S.T.
19 ?*. ., among the Trustor . . JAMES. .M . . ROT^EY .hW. . W ^ Y . M1Y&\ . lUl^ARP. .ANA .WIFE
. .A.S. .JOINT. TENANTS
( h e r ein "Borrower")
MquntajnWest Savings and Loan
(herein "Trustee"), and the Beneficiary,
Mountain West Savings and Loan
a corporation organized and
j i i
r
Utah
u
ji
• 2 4 0 6 WASHINGTON B L V D .

^wim^A^n

whose add r s ,s

shf- •••••

, r • • • ••.••••

(herein
Lender
).
BORROWER, in consideration of the ,indebtedness herein recited and the trust herein
created,
irrevocably
grants
and conveys to Trustee, in trust, with power of sale, the following described property located in the County of
. .. VW ?.R.
, State of Utah:

u

ALL OF LOT 2, CROWTHER SUBDIVISION, IN SOUTH OGOEN CITY, WEBER
COUNTY, UTAH, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF.

which has the address of

4695 BURCH CREEK DRIVE SOUTH OGDEN, UTAH 34403
(Street]
. (herein "Property Address");

tCity]

(State and Zip Code]

TOGETHER with all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements, rights,
appurtenances, rents (subject however to the rights and authorities given herein to Lender to collect and apply such
rents), royalties, mineral, oil and gas rights and profits, water, water rights, and water stock, and all fixtures now or
hereafter attached to the property, all of which, including replacements and additions thereto, shall be deemed to be
and remain a part of the property covered by this Deed of Trust: and all of the foregoing, together with said property
(or the leasehold estate if this Deed of Trust is on a leasehold) ;:re herein referred to as the "Property":
To SECURE to Lender ( a ) the repaxment of the indebtedness evidenced bv Borrower's note dated
AUGUST. .2 9.,. . 1 9 . 8 1
(herein "Note"), in the principal sum of. .*
SEVENTY . N I N E .THOUSAND .AND . 0 0 / 1 . 0 0
Dollars, with interest thereon, providing for monthly
installments of principal and interest, with the balance of the indebtedness, if not sooner paid, due and payable on
S.F,PTEMB.F,R. I , . .2 0 1 . )
: t n c payment of all other sums, with
interest thereon, advanced in accordance herewith to protect the security of this Deed of Trust; and the performance of
the covenants and agreements of Borrower herein contained: and ( b ) the repayment of any future advances, with
interest thereon, made to Borrower by Lender pursuant to paragraph 21 hereof (herein "Future Advances").
Borrower covenants that Borrower is lawfully seised of the estate hereby conveyed and has the right to grant
and convey the Property, that the Property is unencumbered, and that Borrower will warrant and defend generally
the title to the Property against all claims and demands, subject to anv declarations, easements or restrictions listed
in a schedule of exceptions to coverage in any title insurance policy insuring Lender's interest in the Property.
UTAH—1 to 4 Family-6 75-FNMA/FHLMC UNIFORM INSTRUMENT

r ww . ../.,
F181UT-B/78R
Empire Printing

' "

U N I F O R M C O V E N A N T S . Borrower and Lender covenant and agree as follows:
1. Payment of Principal and Interest. Borrower shall promptly pay when due the principal of and interest on the
indebtedness evidenced by the Note, prepayment and late charges as provided in the Note, and the principal of and interest
on any Future Advances secured h\ this Deed of Trust.
2. Funds for Taxes and Insurance. Subject to applicable law or to a written waiver by Lender, Borrower shall pay
to I ender on the day monthly installments of principal and interest are payable under the Note, until the Note is paid in full,
a sum (herein " F u n d s ' ) equal to one-twelfth of the yearly taxes and assessments which may attain priority over this
Deed of Trust, and ground rents on the Property, if any, plus one-twelfth of yearly premium installments for hazard insurance,
plus one-twelfth of yearly premium installments for mortgage insurance, if any. all as reasonably estimated initially and from
time to time by Lender On the basis of assessments and bills and reasonable estimates thereof.
The Funds shall be held in an institution the deposits or accounts of which are insured or guaranteed by a Federal or
state agency (including Lender if Lender is such an institution). Lender shall apply the Funds to pay said taxes, assessments,
insurance premiums and ground rents. Lcndei may not charge for so holding and applying the Funds, analyzing said account
or verifying and compiling said assessments and bills, unless Lender pays Borrower interest on the Funds and applicable law
permits Lender to make such a charge. Borrower and Lender may agree in writing at the time of execution of this
Deed of Trust that interest on the Funds shall be paid to Borrower, and unless such agreement is made or applicable law
requires such interest to be paid. Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on the Funds Lender
shall give to Borrower, without charge, an annual accounting of the Funds showing credits and debits to the Funds and the
purpose for which each debit to the Funds was made. The Funds are pledged as additional security for the sums secured
by this Deed of Trust.
I f the amount of the Funds held by Lender, together with the future monthly installments of Funds payable prior to
the due dates of taxes, assessments, insurance premiums and ground rents, shall exceed the amount required to pay said taxes,
assessments, insurance premiums and ground rents as they fall due, such excess shall be. at Borrower's option, cither
promptly repaid to Borrower or credited to Borrower on monthly installments of Funds. I f the amount of the Funds
held by Lender shall not be sufficient to pay taxes, assessments, insurance premiums and ground rents as they fall due.
Borrower shall pay to Lender any amount necessary to make up the deficiency within 30 days f r o m the date notice is mailed
by Lender to Borrower requesting payment thereof.
Upon payment in full of all sums secured by this Deed of Trust. Lender shall promptly refund to Borrower any Funds
held by Lender. I f under paragraph 18 hereof the Property is sold or the Property is otherwise acquired by Lender. Lender
shall apply, no later than immediately prior to the sale of the Property or its acquisition by Lender, any Funds held by
Lender at the time of application as a credit against the sums secured by this Deed of Trust.
3. Application of Payments. Unless applicable law provides otherwise, all payments received by Lender under the
Note and paiagraphs 1 and 2 hereof shall be applied by Lender first in payment of amounts payable to Lender by Borrower
under paragraph 2 hereof, then to interest payable on the Note, then to the principal of the Note, and then to interest and
principal on any Future Advances.
4. Charges; Liens. Borrower shall pay all taxes, assessments and other charges, fines and impositions attributable to
the Property which may attain a priority over this Deed of Trust, and leasehold payments or ground rents, if any, in the
manner provided under paragraph 2 hereof or, i f not paid in such manner, by Borrower making payment, when due, directly
to the payee thereof. Borrower shall promptly furnish to Lender all notices of amounts due under this paragraph, and in the
event Borrower shall make payment directly. Borrower shall promptly furnish to Lender receipts evidencing such payments.
Borrower shall promptly discharge any lien which has priority over this Deed of Trust; provided, that Borrower shall not be
required to discharge any such lien so long as Borrower shall agree in writing to the payment of the obligation secured by
such lien in a manner acceptable to Lender, or shall in good faith contest such lien by, or defend enforcement of such lien in,
legal proceedings which operate to prevent the enforcement of the lien or forfeiture of the Property or any part thereof.
5. Hazard Insurance. Borrower shall keep the improvements now existing or hereafter erected on the Property insured
against loss by fire, hazards included within the term "extended coverage", and such other hazards as Lender may require
and in such amounts and for such periods as Lender may require; provided, that Lender shall not require that the amount of
such coverage exceed that amount of coverage required to pay the sums secured by this Deed of Trust.
The insurance carrier providing the insurance shall be chosen by Borrower subject to approval by Lender; provided,
that such approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. A l l premiums on insurance policies shall be paid in the manner
provided under paragraph 2 hereof or, if not paid in such manner, by Borrower making payment, when due, directly to the
insurance carrier.
A l l insurance policies and renewals thereof shall be in form acceptable to Lender and shall include a standard mortgage
clause in favor of and in f o r m acceptable to Lender. Lender shall have the right to hold the policies and renewals thereof,
and Borrower shall promptly furnish to Lender all renewal notices and all receipts of paid premiums. I n the event of loss,
Borrower shall give prompt notice to the insurance carrier and Lender. Lender may make proof of loss if not made promptly
by Borrower.
Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in writing, insurance proceeds shall be applied to restoration or repair of
the Property damaged, provided such restoration or repair is economically feasible and the security of this Deed of Trust is
not thereby impaired. I f such restoration or repair is not economically feasible or if the security of this Deed of Trust would
be impaired, the insurance proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by this Deed of Trust, w i t h the excess, i f any, paid
to Borrower. I f the Property is abandoned by Borrower, or if Borrower fails to respond to Lender within 30 days f r o m the
date notice is mailed by Lender to Borrower that the insurance carrier offers to settle a claim for insurance benefits, Lender
is authorized to collect and apply the insurance proceeds at Lender's option either to restoration or repair of the Property
or to the sums secured by this Deed of Trust.
Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in writing, any such application of proceeds to principal shall not extend
or postpone the due date o f the monthly installments referred to in paragraphs I and 2 hereof or change the amount of
such installments. I f under paragraph 18 hereof the Property is acquired by Lender, all right, title and interest of Borrower
in and to any insurance policies and in and to the proceeds thereof resulting from damage to the Property prior to the saie
or acquisition shall pass to Lender to the extent of the sums secured by this Deed of Trust immediately prior to such sale or
acquisition.
6. Preservation and Maintenance of Properly; Leaseholds; Condominiums; Planned Unit Developments. Borrower
shall keep the Properly in good repair and shall not commit waste or permit impairment or deterioration of the Property
and shall comply with the provisions of any lease if this Deed of Trust is on a leasehold. If this Deed of Trust is on a unit in a
condominium or a planned unit development. Borrower shall perform all of Borrower's obligations under the declaration
or covenants creating or governing the condominium or planned unit development, the by-laws and regulations of the
condominium or planned unit development, and constituent documents. I f a condominium or planned unit development
rider is executed by Borrower and recorded together with this Deed of Trust, the covenants and agreements of such rider
shall be incorporated into and shall amend and supplement the covenants and agreements of this Deed of Trust as if the rider
were a part hereof.
7. Protection of Lender's Security. If Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in this
Deed of Trust, or if any action or proceeding is commenced which materially affects Lender's interest in the Property,
including, but not limited to, eminent domain, insoivenc). code enforcement, or arrangements or proceedings involving a
bankrupt or decedent, then Lender at Lender's option, upon notice to Borrower, may make such appearances disburse such
sums and take such action as is necessary to protect Lenders interest, including, but not limited to disbursement of
reasonable attorneys fees and entry upon the Property to make repairs. I f Lender required mortgage insurance as a
condition of making the loan secured by this Deed of Trust. Borrower shall pay the premiums required to maintain such
insurance in effect until such time as the requirement lor such insurance terminates in accordance with Borrower's and
Lender's written agreement or applicable law. Borrower shall pa> the amount of all mortgage insurance premiums in the
manner provided under paragraph 2 hereof.
A n y amounts disbursed by Lender pursuant to this paragraph 7, w i t h interest thereon, shall become additional
indebtedness of Borrower secured by this Deed ol Trust. Unless-Borrower and Lender agree to other terms of payment such
amounts shall be payable upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting pavment thereof, and shall bear interest f r o m the
date of disbursement at the rate payable from time to time on outstanding principal under the Note unless payment of interest
at such rate would be contrary to applicable law. in which event such amounts shall bear interest at the highest rate
permissible under applicable law. Nothing contained in this paragraph 7 shall require Lender to incur any expense or take
3
any action hereunder.
*^
8. Inspection. Lender may make or cause to be made reasonable entries upon and inspections of the Property provided
that Lender shall give Borrower nonce prior, to any such inspection specifying reasonable cause therefor related to Lender'*
UCI
interest in the Property.
*

• f'?•.*.,

9. Condemnation. The proceeds of any award or claim for damages, direct or consequential, in connection with any
condemnation or other taking of the Property, or part thereof, or for conveyance in lieu of condemnation, arc hereby assigned
and shall be paid to Lender.
i n the event of a total taking of the Property, the proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by this Deed o( Trust,
with the excess, if any. paid to Borrower. In the event of u partial taking of the Property, unless Borrower and Lender
otherwise agree in w r i t i n g , there shall be applied to the sums secured by this Deed of Trust such proportion of the proceeds
as is equal to that proportion which the amount of the sums secured by this Deed of Trust immediatel) prior to the date of
taking bears to the fair market value oi the Property immediately prior to the date of taking, with the balance of the proceeds
paid to Borrower.
I f the Property is abandoned by Borrower, or if. after notice by Lender to Borrower that the condemnor offers to make
an award or settle a claim for damages. Borrower fails to respond to Lender within 30 da>s after the date such notice is
mailed, Lender is authorized to collect and apply the proceeds, at Lender's option, either to restoration or repair of the
Property or to the sums secured by this Deed of Trust.
Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in writing, any such application of proceeds to principal shall not extend
or postpone the due date of the monthly installments referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 hereof or change the amount of
such installments.
10. Borrower No( Released. Extension of the time for payment or modification of amortization of the sums secured
by this Deed of Trust granted by Lender to any successor in interest of Borrower shall not operate to release, in any manner,
the liability of the original Borrower and Borrower's successors in interest. Lender shall not be required to commence
proceedings against such successor or refuse to extend time for payment or otherwise modify amortization of the sums
secured by this Deed of Trust by reason of any demand made by the original Borrower and Borrower's successors in interest.
11. Forbearance by Lender No( a Waiver. A n y forbearance by Lender in exercising any right or remedy hereunder, or
otherwise afforded by applicable law, shall not be a waiver of or preclude the exercise of any such right or remedy
The procurement of insurance or the payment of taxes or other liens or charges by Lender shall not be a waiver of Lender's
right to accelerate the maturity of the indebtedness secured by this Deed of Trust.
12. Remedies Cumulative. A l l remedies provided in this Deed of Trust arc distinct and cumulative to any other right
or remedy under this Deed of Trust or afforded by law or equity, and may be exercised concurrently, independently or
successively.
13. Successors and Assigns B o u n d ; Joint and Several Liability; Captions. The covenants and agreements herein
contained shall bind, and the rights hereunder shall inure to, the respective successors and assigns of Lender and Borrower,
subject to the provisions of paragraph 17 hereof. A l l covenants and agreements of Borrower shall be joint and several.
The captions and headings of the paragraphs of this Deed of Trust are for convenience only and are not to be used to
interpret or define the provisions hereof.
14. Notice. Except for any notice required under applicable law to be given in another manner, (a) any notice to
Borrower provided for in this Deed of Trust shall be given by mailing such notice by certified mail addressed to Borrower at
the Property Address or at such other address as Borrower may designate by notice to Lender as provided herein, and
( b ) any notice to Lender shall be given by certified mail, return receipt requested, to Lender's address stated herein or to
such other address as Lender may designate by notice to Borrower as provided herein. A n y notice provided for in this
Deed of Trust shall be deemed to have been given to Borrower or Lender when given in the manner designated herein.
15. U n i f o r m Deed of Trust; Governing L a w ; Severability. This form of deed of trust combines uniform covenants for
national use and non-uniform covenants with limited variations by jurisdiction to constitute a uniform security instrument
covering real property. This Deed of Trust shall be governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the Property is located.
I n the event that any provision or clause of this Deed of Trust or the Note conflicts with applicable law, such conflict shall
not affect other provisions of this Deed of Trust or the Note which can be given effect without the conflicting provision,
and to this end the provisions of the Deed of Trust and the Note are declared to be severable.
16. Borrower's Copy. Borrower shall be furnished a conformed copy of the Note and of this Deed of Trust at the time
of execution or after recordation hereof.
17. Transfer of the Property; Assumption. If all or any part of the Property or an interest therein is sold or transferred
by Borrower without Lender's prior written consent, excluding (a) the creation o f a lien or encumbrance subordinate to
this Deed o f Trust, ( b ) the creation of a purchase money security interest for household appliances, ( c ) a transfer by devise,
descent or by operation of law upon the death of a joint tenant or ( d ) the grant of any leasehold interest of three years or less
not containing an option to purchase. Lender may, at Lender's option, declare all the sums secured by this Deed of Trust to be
immediately due and payable. Lender shall have waived such option to accelerate if, prior to the sale or transfer, Lender
and the person to w h o m the Property is to be sold or transferred reach agreement in w r i t i n g that the credit of such person
is satisfactory to Lender and that the interest payable on the sums secured by this Deed of Trust shall be at such rate as
Lender shall request. I f Lender has waived the option to'accelerate provided in this paragraph 17, and if Borrowers successor
in interest has executed a written assumption agreement accepted in writing by Lender, Lender shall release Borrower from
all obligations under this Deed of Trust and the Note.
I f Lender exercises such option to accelerate. Lender shall mail Borrower notice of acceleration in accordance w i t h
paragraph 14 hereof. Such notice shall provide a period of not less than 30 days f r o m the date the notice is mailed within
which Borrower may pay the sums declared due. If Borrower fails to pay such sums prior to the expiration of such period,
Lender may, without further notice or demand on Borrower, invoke any remedies permitted by paragraph 18 hereof.
N O N - U N I F O R M C O V E N A N T S . Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows:
18. Acceleration; Remedies. Except as provided in paragraph 17 hereof, upon Borrower's breach of any covenant or
agreement of Borrower in this Deed of Trust, including the covenants to pay when due any sums secured by this Deed of
Trust, Lender prior to acceleration shall mail notice to Borrower as provided in paragraph 14 hereof specifying: (1) the
breach; (2) the action required to cure such breach; (3) a date, not less than 30 days f r o m the date the notice Is mailed to
Borrower, by which such breach must be cured; and (4) that failure to cure suc"h breach on or before the date specified in the
notice may result in acceleration of the sums secured by (his Deed of Trust and sale of the Property. The notice shall further
i n f o r m Borrower of the right (o reinstate after acceleration and the right to bring a court action to assert the non-existence
of a default or any other defense of Borrower to acceleration and sale. If the breach is not cured on or before the date
specified in the notice, Lender at Lender's option may declare all of the sums secured by this Deed of Trust to be immediately
due and payable without further demand and (hose remedies permitted by applicable law may be invoked. Lender shall be
entitled to collect all reasonable costs and expenses incurred in pursuing the remedies provided in this paragraph 18,
including, but not limited to, reasonable attorney's fees.
I f the power of sale Is invoked. Trustee shall execute a written notice of the occurrence of an event of default and of the
election to cause the Property to be sold and shall record such notice in each county in which the Property or some part
thereof is located. Lender or Trustee shall mail copies of such notice in the manner prescribed by applicable law to Borrower
and to the other persons prescribed by applicable law. Trustee shall give public notice of sale to the persons and in the
manner prescribed by applicable law. After the lapse of such time as may he required by applicable law, Trustee, without
demand on Borrower, shall sell the Proper!) at public auction to (he highest bidder at the time and place and under (he
(erms designated in the notice of sale in one or more parcels and in such order as Trustee may determine. Trustee may
postpone sale of all or any parcel of the Property by public announcement at the time and place of any previously scheduled
sale. Lender or Lender's designee may purchase the Properly at any sale.
Trustee shall deliver to the purchaser Trustee's deed conveying the Property so sold without any covenant or warranty,
expressed or implied. The recitals in the Trustee's deed shall be prima facie evidence of the truth of the statements made
therein. Trustee shall apph the proceeds of the sale in the following order: (a) In all reasonable costs and expenses of (he
sale, including, but not limited to, reasonable Trustee's and aMorney's fees and costs of title evidence; (b) to all sums secured
by this Deed of Trust; and (c) the excess, if any. to the person or persons legally entitled thereto or to the county clerk of the
county in which the sale took place.
19. Borrower's Right to Reinstate. Notwithstanding Lender's acceleration of the sums secured by this Deed of Trust,
Borrower shall have the right to have any proceedings begun by l e n d e r to enforce this Deed of Trust discontinued at any time
prior to the earlier to occur of (i) the fifth day before sale of the Property pursuant to the power of sale contained in this
Deed of Trust or (n) entr> of a judgment enforcing this Deed o\ Trust if: (a) Borrower pays Lender all sums which would be
then due under this Deed of Trust, the Note and notes securing Future Advances, if any. had no acceleration occurred;
(b) Borrower cures all breaches of any other covenants or agreements of Borrower contained in this Deed of Trust; (c)
Borrower pays all reasonable expenses incurred by Lender and Trustee in enforcing the covenants and agreements of Borrower
contained in this Deed of Trust and in enforcing Lender's and Trustee's remedies as provided in paragraph 18 hereof,
including, but not limited to. reasonable attorney's fees: and (d) Borrower takes such action as Lender may reasonably require

secured by this Deed of Trust shall continue unimpaired. Upon such payment and cure by Borrower, this Deed of Trust and
the obligations secured hereby shall remain in full force and effect as it no acceleration had occurred.
20. Assignment of Rents; Appointment of Receiver; Lender in Possession. As additional security hereunder. Borrower
hereby assigns to Lender the rents of the Property, provided that Borrower shall, prior to acceleration under paragraph 18
hereof or abandonment of the Property, have the right to collect and retain such rents as they become due and payable.
Upon acceleration under paragraph IK hereof or abandonment of the Property. Lender, in person, by agent or by
judicially appointed receiver, shall be entitled to enter upon, take possession of and manage the Property and to collect the
rents of the Property, including those past due. A l l rents collected by Lender or the receiver shall be applied first to payment
of the costs of management of ihc Property and collection of rents, including, but not limited to. receiver's fees, premiums on
receiver's bonds and reasonable attorneys fees, and then to the sums secured by this Deed of Trust. Lender and the receiver
shall be liable to account only for those rents actually received.
2 1 . Future Advances. Upon request of Borrower, Lender, at Lender's option prior to full reconveyance of the Property
by Trustee to Borrower, may make Future Advances to Borrower. Such Future Advances, with interest thereon, shall be
secured by this Deed of Trust when evidenced by promissory notes slating that said notes are secured hereby.
22. Reconveyance. Upon payment of all sums secured by this Deed of Trust. Lender shall request Trustee to rcconvcy
the Property and shall surrender this Deed of Trust and all notes evidencing indebtedness secured by this Deed of Trust to
Trustee. Trustee shall reconvey the Property without warranty and without charge to the person or persons legally entitled
thereto. Such person or persons shall pay all costs of recordation, if any.
23. Substitute Trustee. Lender, at lender's option, may from time to time remove Trustee and appoint a successor
trustee to any Trustee appointed hereunder. Without conveyance of the Property, the successor trustee shall succeed to all
the title, power and duties conferred upon the Trustee herein and by applicable law.
24. Request for Notices. Borrower requests that copies of the notice of default and notice of sale be sent to Borrower's
address which is the Property Address.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Borrower has executed this Deed of Trust.

STATEOFUTAH,. .. W .E?. E .R

••ftPV

Countys

On this. .. . 2RTI1
day of. . . A.UP«ST .
. .JAMES. .M .. .ROTHEY . AND. .BF.VER.L.Y. K97.
of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged ic
My Commission expires:

''/
19. § I., personally a^^nred bcfpre'me
/ ; V*.-., th'e'sifen^^
fccute/l the same.
y .• ^
O \Cj
I -J
-. O ' yo
Notary Public residing at:

OGOF.N UTAH
REQUEST FOR RECONVEYANCE

v^.
v

• " • . ^

To TRUSTEE:

The undersigned is the holder of the note or notes secured by this Deed of Trust. Said note or notes, together
with all other indebtedness secured by this Deed of Trust, have been paid in full. You arc hereby directed to cancel
said note or notes and this Deed of Trust, which arc delivered hereby, and to reconvey, without warranty, all the
estate now held by you under this Deed of Trust to the person or persons legally entitled thereto.
Date:

(Space Below This Line Reserved For Lender and Recorder)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH
i

BRUCE C. EDWARD,
Plaintiffs),

DECISION

vs.
AMERICAN INTERSTATE MORTGAGE
CORPORATION, a nonresident corporation,

Case No.: 940900438 CN

Defendant(s),

The issue before the court essentially is what is the current status of payments on the
mortgage held by American Instate Mortgage. After considerable testimony it is clear at this
point that the two payments at issue are for the months of June and July of 1993.
Furthermore, after sorting through the tangled interaction between Mr. Edwards and
American Interstate Mortgage, it is this Court's conclusion that there does not exist privity of
contract between the parties such that Mr. Edwards can make demands on the mortgage company
pursuant to the trust deed note, nor can the mortgage company make demands on Mr. Edwards
to perform under the trust deed and note.
Any interest in the property at this point held by Mr. Edwards arises out of the fact that he
is a possessor of the subject property who has made payments on the note and may have made
improvements to the property. As a result of the mortgage company's attempt to foreclose on the
property which threatened Mr. Edward's possessory interest; this action is before the court.
The court reaches the following conclusions. Mr. Edwards has not made the mortgage
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payments for the months of June and July 1993. To bring the account current it is necessary that
those two payments be made. Despite the mortgage companys numerous errors in determining
what specific amounts were owed under the note, it would not be fair to simply ignore the clear
fact that Mr. Edwards did not make those two payments.
On the other hand, the mortgage company is not entitled to recover late fees and interest
on the past due amount. By their own conduct they are precluded as a matter of equity from
receiving the substantial sums they seek. The record is replete with examples of conflicting
statements as to what was owed. It would be grossly unfair to require Mr. Edwards to pay
penalties including interest when the demands made upon him were so highly contradictory of
each other and inconsistent.
Because the two payments are owed, they are due and payable within 15 days from the
date of this Order. If they are not paid, then the mortgage company is entitled to proceed anew
with a foreclosure action.
In addition, in order to clarify the status of this account and prevent future confusion from
developing, the Court finds based on the mortgage company's testimony, that the balance on the
mortgage will be $60,538.88; after the June and July payments are made.
With regard to Mr. Edwards claim that he is owed monies from the reserve account for
overpayment on taxes and insurance, this Court declines to enter any order on that since his
interest is possessory in nature, not contractual. Furthermore, those funds, pursuant to the Note,
are not subject to being dispensed prior to payoff on the Note, but are held as security for the
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f

Note.

No evidence was presented at trial in support of plaintiff s claim of Defamation of
Character (Third Cause of Action). Slander of Title (Fourth Cause of Action) is not at issue since
the evidence disclosed that Mr. Edwards does not hold title to the propeny. There is no evidence
of Fraud or Extortion (Fifth Cause of Action) nor of Intentional Misrepresentation (Sixth Cause
of Action). No claim was made at trial by plaintiff for punitive damages.
DATED this j 2 £ ^ day of January, 1998.

PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decision, first
class mail and postage prepaid, to the following parties this <=* day ot-January, 1998.
DAVID J. KNOWLTON
Attorney for Plaintiff
427 27th Street
Ogden Utah 84401

DOUGLAS DURBANO
Attorney for Defendant
3340 Harrison Blvd. #200
Ogden Utah 84403
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DAVID J. KNOWLTON 1850
Attorney for Defendant Edwards
427 27th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 621 4852
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

yjf*
AMERICAN INTERSTATE
MORTGAGE,
Plaintiff.

)

S^^

)

JUDGMENT AND ORDER

Vs.

)

Civil No. 980907330

MICHAEL E. FLYNN, et. al.,

)

Judge W. Brent West

Defendant.

)

Defendant Bruce C. Edwards' motion for order compelling discovery and for sanctions along
with his motion to join James and Helen Edwards as parties to the action, and plaintiffs motions to
dismiss the action as to Bruce C. Edwards and for the appointment of a receiver having all come on
regularly for hearing on the 7th day of July, 1999, the Honorable W. Brent West, District Judge
presiding, and the plaintiff appearing by and through his counsel of record, George W. Burbidge II,
and the defendant Bruce C. Edwards appearing personally along with his counsel of record, David
J. Knowiton and the court having heard and received the arguments of counsel and having examined
the evidence offered, and being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefore,
now,
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED that defendant Bruce C.
Edwards shall have and is hereby granted further and additional judgment against the plaintiff in the
sum of $500.00, together with lawful postjudgment interest thereon at the rate of 7.45% per annum

until fully paid and satisfied. This judgment award is in addition to the judgment previously ordered
in the above matter in the sum of $375.00, together with postjudgment interest thereon at the rate
of 7.45% per annum at the hearing of April 28,1999.
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED that the plaintiff shall be and
is hereby ordered to fully answer and comply with the defendant's Request for Production of
Documents and Interrogatories served by defendant Edwards on or about the 9th of April, 1999, in
the above matter. Specifically, the plaintiff shall answer and comply with paragraphs L, 6, 7, and 8
of the discovery request. Plaintiff need not respond to paragraphs 2, 3. 4, and 5 of the request in
view of the prior order of the court denying to plaintiff any attorney fees from defendant Edwards
from the companion matter tried to Judge HefFernan.
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED that the trial date heretofore
set in the above matter for the 27th day of July, 1999, shall be and is hereby stricken. The matter shall
not be reset for trial until discovery by the parties has been completed and additional parties have been
properly joined consistent with this order. Then these items are accomplished, then either of the
parties may submit a new notice of readiness for trial and request for trial setting.
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED that all discovery in the
matter shall end by the 30th of July, 1999.
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED that defendant Edwards'
motion to join James and Helen Edwards as additional parties defendant shall be and is hereby
granted, and plaintiff shall proceed to have them properly served with summons and complaint in the
matter.
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED that plaintiffs motion to
dismiss the action as to defendant Bruce C. Edwards shall be and is hereby denied.
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IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED that plaintiffs motion to
appoint a receiver shall be and is hereby denied.
<f*
Dated this l ^ ' d a y of July, 1999.
BY THE COURT:

W. BRENT WEST
District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Certify mailing a true and correct copy of the foregoing to George W. Burbidge II, Attorney
for Plaintiff, 476 W. Heritage Park Blvd., Suite 200, Layton,/Wtah 84041^his 7th day of July, 1999,
postage prepaid.
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CERTIFICATE OP SALE
CIVIL NO. 926902159

.'

I, Craig Dearden. Sheriff of Weber County, State of Utah, *1,>
heraby certify that under and by virtue of an Execution issued
out of the Second Judicial District Court in an action lately
pending in said Court at the suit of Bolt and Nut Supply Company,
Plaintiff,
against
Michael
E.
Flynn
dba
Commercidi
Roofing/Reslder}tial Rooting, Defendant* attested on Che 15th day
of July, 1992, by which I was commanded to make the sum of
$54 5.23 with interest* costs, and Sheriff's Fees, amounting in
all to the sum of S954-G9 to satisfy the judgment in said action
out- of the personal property of said Defendant. if sufficient
personal property could be found and if sufficient persona)
property could not be found* than of the unexempted rea) property
o£ the said Defendant. All as more fully appears by the said
Writ, reference thereto being hereby made. I have levied upon,
and on the lBth day of August, 1992. at 2:00 o'clock p-m. of said
day at the East Front Door of the City and County Building, in
Ogden Cityt Weber County* Utah duly sold at public auction,
according to the law, and cfter due and legal notice to, Judgment
Collection Systems for the sum of $1.00, lawful money of the
United States, which was the highest bid made and the whole price
paid for all the right, title, claim and interest of said
Defendant, of in and to the following described real estate, tox*iv;
All of Lot 2, Croweher Subdivision, South Ogden City. Weber
County, Utah, Tax ID 0C »QC0 0000
I further
certify -char 5 a ^ p*-operty
5* «n>»i-ct *«-»
redemption in lawful money of the Unitad State* pursuant to the
statute in such cased made and provided*
Dated at Ogden City, Utah, this 21st day of September, 1992CRAIG DEARDEN
SHERIFF OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

By l-Tf^y TW;*CHIEF PAUL NEW]
Deputy S h e r i f f

The
signer(s)
of the
within
i n s t r u m e n t , who
duly
acknowledged t o me t h a t he executed t h e same. Date t h i s 2 1 s t day
of September, 1992

R e s i d i n g : Ogden, Utah
Commission E x p i r e s :
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SJDTM

2/l<t/94>

;\
I:)

^-trS

rwu-..-» Jj
M*C<M"VW«"* 5 •
5

T A ~ '»

••'

FROM : MUT-UAULT-»

PHONE NO.
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Es 1 1 S 6 4 S S B K i o 3 3 rGGO-VO
DQU6 CR0FTS> WEBER COUNTY RECORDED
22-JUL-92
3 1 £ PH FEE S 9 . 0 0 DEP MH
REC FOR: WEBER-CCUNTY.SHERIFF
I

LEW
STATE OF UTAH

C.-JtfEOV WSC50,

COUNTY OF WEBER
Notice is hereby given, that under and b y virtue of a Writ
o£ Execution issued out ^o£ the District Court of the State of
Utah, of which the annexed
is a true copy.
X have this day
attached and levied upc^r all the right, title, claim and interest
of Michael E . Flynn dba Commercial
Roofing/Residential Roofing,
defendants, or either of them, of. in ±n& to ths following
described real estate, standing on the records
of Weber County.
in
the
name
of
Michael
E.
Flynn
dba
Commercial
Roofing/Residential
Roofing end
particularly
described as
follows:

\

VJ

All of Lot 2, Croweher Subdivision.
County t Utah * Tax ID•

South Ogden City, Weber

CRAIG DEARDEN
Sheriff of Vebar County, Utah

$

«££

By

Deputy S h e r i f f
^
<*

The signer(e) of the within instrument, w h o duly acknowledge^ to
me that: h e executed the same* Dated July 22, 1992.

'uJL*t=

$
^
*>>
Residing a t : Ogden, Utah *
My Commission Expires; 2/14/94*

• iibV*s5iFT*uflLi2r j
fttTsvwwcxnsTEa

I^

?S6lOrftnt*4V0

Opdgi oar* gHOI
m fiWAW*" f
© l14. —
19*
I
p*o
S T A Tr^OFOTAH
S4
I

i Hi

I>
i&
3

s
3

kMMr^^'^.wkd

Ml
..

*«»

M l

•yM

TabE

"SHERIFF'S DEED
THIS INDENTURE made between CRAIG DEARDEN, Sheriff of Weber
County, State of Utah, referred herein as "SHERIFF", and James W.
Edwards and Helen F. Edwards, as joint tenants, parties of the
second part,
WHEREAS, pursuant to a certain judgment and d£etee"''maae and
entered by the Second Judicial District Court on the 15th day of
July, 1992 in a certain action then pending in said Court,
wherein Bolt and Nut Supply Company, Plaintiff, and Michael E.
Flynn dba Commercial Roofing/Residential Roofing, Defendant, it
was among other things ordered and adjudged that the hereinafter
described real property should be sold at public auction by and
under the direction of the Sheriff in the manner required by law.
And,
WHEREAS, the Sheriff did at the hour of 2:00 o'clock p.m. on
the 18th day of August, 1992 at the front door of the Municipal
Building in Ogden City, Weber County, Utah after due notice had
been given, as required by law and said judgment, duly sell at
public auction, the real property referred to in said judgment
and hereinafter described; at which sale said real property was
sold to Judgment Collection Systems for the sum of $1.00 Dollar,
being the highest bidder and that being the highest sum bid at
said sale. And,
WHEREAS, said Judgment Collection Systems thereupon paid to
the said Sheriff said sum of money, so bid and said Sheriff
thereupon made and issued the usual certificate in duplicate of
such sale in due form, and delivered one thereof to said buyer,
and caused the other to be filed in the office of the County
Recorder, Weber County, Utah. And,
WHEREAS, more than six months have elapsed since the day of
sale, and no redemption of the property so sold has been made.
AND WHEREAS, said Judgment Collection Systems purchaser as
aforesaid did, on the 19th day of August, 1992 sell assign and
transfer said Certificate of Sale and all his rights thereunder
to James W. Edwards and Helen F. Edwards, as joint tenants, the
said parties of the second part, and duly authorized said Sheriff
to make a deed for said premises, in pursuance of said sale to
said James W. Edwards and Helen F. Edwards, as joint tenants.
NOW, THEREFORE, the Sheriff, in order to carry into effect
said sale pursuant to said judgment and of the law, and also in
consideration of the money so bid and paid, receipt of which is
hereby acknowledged, by these presents does grant, sell and
convey unto said party of the second part, the following
described real property situated in Weber County, Utah, being all
the right, title, and interest of the above named defendant in
and to the following described property, to-wit:

A l l of Lot 2, Croweher S u b d i v i s i o n , South Ogden
County, Utah. Tax ID 06-060-0002

C i t y , Weber
~~~^r
..: * ~A- *. V?~ "•

Together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments
and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining,
to have and to hold the same_unto said parties of the second
part, their heirs and assigns forever. '
•'<•_:..WITNESS the hand of said Sheriff this 25th day of May, 1994.'

CRAIG DEARDEN
Sheriff of Weber County, Utah

CAPTAIN WESLEY D.
• Deputy Sherif

ERRY --

Signed, Sealed and Delivered
in the presence of:

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF WEBER

)

ss

On the 25th day of May, 1994 personally appeared beforeHmeT"1
Captain Wesley D. Goldsberry, Deputy Sheriff of Weber County,
State of Utah, the signer of the foregoing instrument, who"
acknowledged to me that he executed the same as such Sheriff for
the uses and purposes therein mentioned.
WITNESS my

hand and notarial

seal, this

25th day of

1994.

NpfARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires: 1/26/98
Residing at: Ogden, Utah
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Certify mailing two true and correct copies of the foregoing to David J. Jordan, Attorney
for PlaintifT/Appellant, 201 South Main Street, 1:

Xity, Utah 84111-4904 this 3rd
/

day of July, 2001, postage prepaid.
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